The Houthis are stepping up activity in the Red Sea, targeting both Israel and shipping linked to it. On September 4, UK Maritime Trade Operations reported suspicious activity after a vessel in the Red Sea was hit by an “unknown projectile” at a distance. The ship was unharmed but also reported severe electronic interference. This marks the 30th maritime incident of 2025, following a lull after July’s sinking of two bulk carriers. Recent weeks have seen more missile and drone claims by the Houthis, including against tankers and containerships, though several reports remain unconfirmed. At the same time, vessel traffic in the Red Sea has reached its highest level since January 2024, with LPG and bulk carriers increasing transits, while most container lines continue to reroute around Africa. Analysts warn the Houthis may be extending their reach further north, closer to Saudi Arabia, raising regional security concerns. Meanwhile, Israel has vowed stronger responses after intercepting multiple recent launches and striking back against Houthi leadership.

The Iranian Navy has begunreturning to the port of Bandar Abbas six weeks after an emergency evacuation

during the 12-Day War. This marks one of the first signs of the countryrestoring its military and logistical infrastructure. Key Southern Fleet

vessels, including frigates, landing ships, reconnaissance vessels, and part ofthe supply fleet, are back in port. However, some critical assets—like the

submarine IRINS Tarek and the flagship IRINS Makran—have yet to return. Over recentweeks, ships have been entering port individually to refuel and resupply before

relocating to coastal anchorages, avoiding congestion. This strategy hasmaintained minimal logistical operations amid a tense internal situation. The

Navy’s return is a significant signal: Iran is seeking to reassert control overstrategic maritime points, including transport infrastructure and defense

logistics. Despite ongoing political tensions, the revival of naval activitymay help stabilize supply chains, trade flows, and transport corridors in the

Persian Gulf region.

The Suez Canal Authority (SCA) has reported that 10 large containerships, including 6 from CMA CGM and 4 from MSC, have transited the canal since the launch of a 15% discount program in mid-May 2025. This initiative aims to bring back traffic amid Red Sea tensions.

The CMA CGM Zephyr, carrying 11,800 TEU, was one of the largest vessels to pass through recently. The SCA is also promoting its services to vehicle carriers — BYD Xi’an and BYD Hefei both made transits carrying thousands of cars. A 20% increase in vehicle carrier tonnage is expected in H2 2025.

Despite security concerns due to Houthi attacks, CMA CGM vessels are returning, supported by EUNAVFOR Aspides naval escorts in the region.

Despite major investments by the US and its allies in military infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific, deterrence strategy remains vulnerable without guaranteed access through Indonesia. Passage through key maritime and air corridors of the archipelago is critical for force mobility in any conflict scenario. However, Jakarta’s political neutrality, focus on strategic autonomy, and the lack of clear transit agreements make such access uncertain. Without strong diplomatic engagement and trust-building, even the most advanced bases in Guam and Darwin cannot ensure the real effectiveness of allied strategy.

Iran launched a rare daytime missile attack on Haifa and other parts of Israel just hours after Maersk announced it would suspend vessel calls and cargo acceptance at the Port of Haifa due to rising security risks. Around 23 ballistic missiles targeted Haifa, injuring at least 17 people. The attack seemingly avoided the port, but Haifa remains crucial to Israel's trade, handling over one-third of container imports. Maersk redirected its vessels to Ashdod, while other carriers like CMA CGM and MSC have not made major changes yet. The situation highlights potential strain on regional logistics infrastructure if more operators suspend operations.